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 1 Introduction
Food scandals like the BSE crisis, the melamine found in Chinese milk in 2008 and the dioxin
contamination of animal feed in Germany in 2010 have given rise to serious consumer concerns
over food quality. In response, both governments and food industries have tightened food safety
regulations. In particular, food retailers have implemented either collectively or individually
private quality standards, which add to public regulation. These quality standards do not only
cover safety aspects, but also refer to social and environmental issues. They clarify product
and process speci￿cations, stipulate how these speci￿cations are met and de￿ne each trading
partner￿ s responsibilities. Thereby, product standards refer to the physical properties of the
￿nal products, such as maximum residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides and herbicides, threshold
values for additives and requirements for packaging material. Process standards, in turn, relate
to properties of the production process, including hygiene, sanitary and pest-control measures,
the prohibition of child labor, animal-welfare standards and food quality management systems.
Particularly, the quality of fresh fruits, vegetables and meat products is regulated by retailers￿
private quality standards. Examples include the British Retail Consortium (BRC) Global Stan-
dard for Food Safety and GlobalGAP as collective private standards and Tesco￿ s Nature￿ s Choice
and Carrefour￿ s FiliŁre QualitØ as individual private standards.1 As retailers tend to supplement
them with individual requirements (OECD 2006), quality requirements may di⁄er widely among
the individual retailers. In Germany, for example, the MRLs for pesticides established by some
large retail chains in 2008 ranged from 80% of the public MRL (Aldi, Norma), to 70% (REWE,
Edeka, Plus), to as low as 33% (Lidl) (PAN Europe 2008). The British retailer Marks & Spencer
even plans to have all of its fruit, vegetables and salads free of any pesticide residues by 2020
(Marks & Spencer 2010). It is controversial whether retailers use private quality standards as
a strategic instrument to gain buyer power in procurement markets.2 This might be especially
true when suppliers must use speci￿c technologies in order to comply with the individual quality
standards of the retailers. So far, this conjecture has not been formally proven.3 We intend to
narrow this gap with a theoretical analysis of retailers￿quality choice and its implications for
market structure and social welfare.
We consider a vertical structure with two independent downstream retailers that are sup-
plied by a ￿nite number of upstream suppliers.4 First, the retailers decide upon their quality
requirements. Then, the suppliers choose which quality standard they meet and which retailer
they supply. Thereby, compliance with a higher quality standard is associated with higher qual-
ity costs. Given the retailers￿quality requirements and the suppliers￿delivery decision, both
1Besides the prevention of potential revenue losses due to reputation (OECD 2006), retailers￿incentives for
private standard setting might be to respond to public minimum standards (e.g., Valletti 2000; Crampes and
Hollander 1995; Ronnen 1991), to pre-empt or in￿ uence public regulation (e.g., McCluskey and Winfree 2009;
Lutz et al. 2000), to substitute for inadequate public regulation in developing countries (e.g., Marcoul and
Veyssiere 2010), and to safeguard against liability claims (e.g., Giraud-HØraud et al. 2006b, 2008).
2There is also a strong debate on whether increasing quality requirements by large retailers may impose entry
barriers for suppliers in developing countries, in particular for small-scale producers (e.g., OECD 2007, 2006; EC
2006; Garc￿a Martinez and Poole 2004; Balsevich et al. 2003; Boselie et al. 2003).
3Generally, the understanding of the strategic aspects of private quality standards in vertical relations is still
underdeveloped (Hammoudi et al. 2009).
4An upstream ￿rm can be any kind of supplier, such as a primary producer, a processor or an export organi-
zation abroad. The industry structure re￿ ects the situation in many countries where a relatively large number of
suppliers face a highly concentrated retail sector (e.g., Dobson et al. 2003; OECD 2006).
2retailers enter into bilateral negotiations with their respective suppliers about quantity forcing
delivery tari⁄s. These consist of the quantity to be delivered by the supplier and a ￿xed pay-
ment to be made in return by the retailer. Upon successful completion of the negotiations with
the selected retailer, manufacturers produce and deliver their products to the selected retailer.
Finally, the retailers sell the goods to ￿nal consumers.
Our results show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the retailers￿quality choice as
long as production costs are su¢ ciently high and increasing in the retailers￿quality requirements.
This result is driven by the retailers￿incentive to weaken the suppliers￿outside option and, thus,
to reduce their bargaining strength. In other words, the retailer strategically use the private
quality standards to obtain a better bargaining position vis-￿-vis the suppliers. Suppose that
the retailers implement the same quality standard, than￿ in case of negotiation breakdown￿ the
suppliers can easily switch their delivery from one to the other retailer. In the case of di⁄ering
quality requirements, suppliers complying with the lower quality standard cannot switch their
delivery to the retailer with the higher quality requirements. However, suppliers producing
according to the higher quality standard can opt to deliver to the retailer with the less demanding
quality requirements. However, the low-quality retailer does not reward overcompliance with its
quality standard. Thus, the value of the supplier￿ s outside option is decreasing in the di⁄erence
in quality standards. Thus, a retailer has always an incentive to either exceed or undercut a
given quality standard of the other retailer. By decreasing its quality requirements, the retailer
turns its suppliers￿outside option to zero. At the same time, the retailer￿ s joint pro￿t with the
suppliers is decreasing. In turn, by increasing its quality requirements the retailer only reduces
the suppliers￿outside option but increases its joint pro￿t with the suppliers. In comparison,
the low-quality retailer gets a larger share of a smaller pie, while the high-quality retailer gets a
smaller share of a larger pie.
Our analysis is related to the large theoretical literature on buyer power, which studies
the sources of buyer power and its implications for the overall e¢ ciency of vertical relations.5
Potential sources of buyer power analyzed so far include credible threats to vertically integrate
or to support market entry at the upstream level (e.g., Katz 1987; She⁄man and Spiller 1992),
potential delisting strategies after downstream mergers (e.g., Inderst and Sha⁄er 2007) as well as
producers￿di⁄erentiation (Chambolle and Berto Villas-Boas 2010). We show that downstream
￿rms￿ private quality standards may constitute an additional source of buyer power. With
regard to the e¢ ciency e⁄ects of buyer power, Inderst and Wey (2003, 2007) point out that the
formation of large buyers and, thus, the emergence of buyer power may increase consumer surplus
as well as overall welfare since suppliers￿investment incentives increase. Montez (2008) shows
that an upstream ￿rm may choose higher capacities when buyers merge as long as the costs of
capacity are su¢ ciently low. Negative welfare e⁄ects due to increased buyer power are analyzed
by Inderst and Sha⁄er (2007). They ￿nd that a retail merger can induce the manufacturers
to reduce the variety of their products in order to comply with ￿ average￿preferences (see also
Chen (2004)). Moreover, Battigalli et al. (2007) derive the result that buyer power weakens a
supplier￿ s incentive to invest in quality improvement. We show that buyer power due to private
standard setting decreases social welfare.
Although quality standards receive growing attention in the theoretical economic literature,
5For a survey on the sources and consequences of buyer power, see Inderst and Mazarotto (2008) as well as
Inderst and Sha⁄er (2008).
3few papers address private standards in vertical relations.6 Among the papers covering private
quality standards, Bazoche et al. (2005) and Giraud-HØraud et al. (2006a) analyze individual
private standards. Giraud-HØraud et al. (2006a) show that the incentive for a retailer to
di⁄erentiate its business via a premium private label (PPL) is the higher the lower the public
MQS. Bazoche et al. (2005), in turn, analyze the e⁄ects of a retailer￿ s PPL for a given level of
the public MQS. In their model, the retailer introducing the PPL would choose an intermediate
level of the private quality standard to segment the market. Furthermore, Giraud-HØraud et
al. (2006b and 2008) study collective standard setting. Both papers analyze the introduction
of a collective standard for a given public MQS, assuming that retailers are price takers in the
procurement market. In their models, the retailers￿incentive to implement a collective standard
depends on the existence of a legal liability rule.
2 The Model
We consider a food supply chain with two symmetric downstream retailers Di, i = 1;2, and
N ￿ 2 symmetric upstream suppliers Uij; j = 1;:::;N. Note that the index i refers to the
retailer i the upstream ￿rm Uij delivers to. We assume without loss of generality that N1
upstream ￿rms, U11;:::;U1N1, produce a homogeneous intermediate good and sell it exclusively
to the downstream ￿rm D1, while the remaining N2 = N ￿N1 upstream ￿rms, U2N1+1;:::;U2N;
manufacture a homogeneous intermediate good and deliver it exclusively to the downstream ￿rm
D2. The retailers transform the received inputs on a one-to-one basis into a single consumer
good each. That is, retailer D1 produces good 1 and retailer D2 produces good 2: Both retailers
operate as local monopolists in two independent markets.7 This allows us to analyze the quality
decision of the retailers abandoning any impact of downstream competition.8
Each retailer implements a private quality standard qi; i = 1;2; which has to be ful￿lled by
the suppliers. This implies that the suppliers do not get their products sold to the retailers unless
they comply with the respective quality standards. Hence, the N1 upstream ￿rms delivering to
retailer D1 produce at the quality level q1; while the N2 upstream ￿rms supplying retailer D2
adhere to the quality standard q2: We assume that the product quality is observable to all agents,
i.e. suppliers, retailers, and consumers.9
Demand. Each retailer Di faces an inverse demand
pi(qi;Xi) = maxfqi ￿ Xi;0g; 8i = 1;2; (1)
where Xi denotes the overall quantity the retailer Di sells to ￿nal consumers. The overall
quantity the retailer sells consists of the sum of intermediate inputs delivered by the upstream
6For example, Valletti (2000), Crampes and Hollander (1995) and Ronnen (1991) analyze private standard
setting in response to the introduction of a public minimum standard. Focussing on product di⁄erentiation, private
quality decisions of ￿rms are also studied by Motta (1993) and Gal-Or (1985, 1987), for example. However, all
these papers neglect vertical supply structures.
7Local monopolies in retailing may, for example, result from consumers￿one-stop shopping preferences.
8This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5, where we consider Cournot competition at the downstream
level.
9Note that the product quality is not necessarily directly communicated to consumers, but consumers might








a = 1; A = N1 for i = 1
a = N1 + 1; A = N for i = 2
; (2)
where xij refers to the quantity the supplier Uij sells to the retailer Di. Furthermore, we assume
that consumers￿willingness to pay for a good i is positively correlated with the respective quality
parameter qi.10
Negotiations. Given the retailers￿quality requirements, the upstream ￿rms decide which
quality standard they comply with and, thus, which retailer they supply. Before production
takes place, each retailer negotiates bilaterally and simultaneously with each of its respective
suppliers a delivery contract Tij. Referring to the fact that vertical relations are often based on
more complex contracts than simple linear pricing rules (Rey and VergØ 2008), we assume that
the delivery contract has the form of a quantity-forcing contract.11 Such a contract speci￿es
both the quantity xij the supplier Uij has to deliver to the retailer Di and the ￿xed payment
Fij the supplier Uij receives from the retailer Di in exchange for the delivery. The delivery
contracts are considered to be short-term.12 Note that we do not allow for renegotiation in
the case of negotiation breakdown between any retailer-supplier pair. Negotiation outcomes are
observable to all players. Moreover, both the suppliers and the retailers are fully committed to
these contracts.
Costs. While the downstream retailers￿costs of transformation and distribution are normal-
ized to zero, each upstream supplier incurs total costs of C(xij;qi) for producing the quantity xij
at the quality level qi; where C(0;qi) = 0 and Cxij(0;qi) = 0: The cost functions are twice con-
tinuously di⁄erentiable, increasing and strictly convex in both xij and qi, i.e. for all xij;qi > 0
it holds that
C￿(xij;qi); C￿￿(xij;qi);Cxijqi(xij;qi) > 0 with ￿ = xij;qi. (3)
Note that the convexity in quantities re￿ ects decreasing returns to scale and implies that the
suppliers are capacity-constrained, while the convexity in qualities characterizes a decreasing








ij for 0 < qi <
p
2; 8i = 1;2: (4)
Besides the usage of more sophisticated variable inputs like high-quality raw materials (Motta
1993), the adherence to a higher quality standard requires di⁄erent production technologies (e.g.,
Mayen et al. 2009) and changes in the production processes (e.g., Codron et al. 2005). For the
sake of simplicity, we normalize any quality-related ￿xed costs to zero. Nevertheless, we take into
account that the decision to produce according to a particular quality standard is associated
10It has been shown, for example, that consumers are willing to pay a premium for eco-labeled food (Bougherara
and Combris 2009), for organic products (Gil et al. 2000), for milk quality attributes (Bernard and Bernard 2009;
Brooks and Lusk 2010; Kanter et al. 2009), and for beef quality attributes (Gao and Schroeder 2009).
11Note that non-linear tari⁄s are commonly used in intermediate goods markets. Empirical evidence is provided
by Bonnet and Dubois (2010) and Berto Villas-Boas (2007).
12This is in accordance with observations that "a large portion of the contracts observed in the agro-food sector
are short-term or single-season contracts" (Jang and Olson 2010, p. 252).
13Decreasing quality gains are considered to be more realistic than constant or even increasing ones (Bazoche
et al. 2005). For the suppliers￿pro￿t functions to be concave in quality, however, the cost functions have to be
su¢ ciently convex in quality (cp. Bazoche et al. 2005).
5with speci￿c technologies, production facilities, or the development and implementation of a
particular quality-management system. This precludes any short-term changes in the quality-
related production process. As a consequence the variable costs of quality cannot be adjusted
in the short-term, neither upwards nor downwards, since they at least partly hinge on the
production process implemented to ful￿ll a certain quality standard.14
Pro￿ts. The downstream ￿rms￿pro￿ts are given by15





a = 1; A = N1 for i = 1
a = N1 + 1; A = N for i = 2
; (5)
where Ri(Xi;￿) = pi(Xi;qi)Xi denotes the revenue of retailer Di. Our assumptions on the inverse
demand guarantee that the pro￿t ￿Di (￿) is strictly concave in Xi.
For the upstream ￿rm Uij supplying the downstream ￿rm Di; the pro￿t refers to
￿Uij(￿) = Fij ￿ C(xij;qi); 8i = 1;2; j = 1;:::;N: (6)
In summary, we consider the following four-stage game. First, the two retailers Di impose a
private quality standard qi. Given the quality choice of the retailers, the N upstream ￿rms Uij
decide which downstream ￿rm they supply and, therefore, which quality standard they comply
with. This decision determines the suppliers￿quality-related production costs. In the third stage,
both retailers negotiate with their respective suppliers about quantity-forcing delivery contracts
Tij(xij;Fij). Production takes place upon successful completion of the negotiations. Finally, the
retailers sell to consumers, whereby each retailer￿ s total quantity Xi o⁄ered is restricted by the
quantity-forcing contracts negotiated before.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Using subgame perfection as our solution concept, we proceed by backward induction.16 Given
the described outside option, the negotiations in the intermediate goods market proceed as
follows. Each supplier Uij negotiates with its selected retailer Di about a quantity-forcing
contract. In the case of disagreement with Di, the supplier Uij can switch to the other retailer
Dk when complying with the respective quality requirements qk: Hence, the supplier Ukj can
only switch to Di if qi ￿ qk; while it has no outside option in the case of qi > qk: Using subgame
perfection as our equilibrium concept, we ￿rst analyze the negotiation outcome when the supplier
Uij has switched from Di to Dk and then turn to the negotiations between the supplier and its
initially chosen retailer Di.
Speci￿cation of the Disagreement Payo⁄s. We denote an upstream ￿rm that switches
14For example, improved quality-management systems require higher-skilled personnel as well as more frequent
documentation and sampling requirements (Rau and van Tongeren 2009; Preidl and Rau 2006). The decision for
a particular inventory method applied to perishable goods is another case in point. While the FIFO (￿rst in, ￿rst
out) policy is associated with higher variable costs, the LIFO (last in, ￿rst out) policy entails lower quality-related
variable costs (Reyniers and Tapiero 1995).
15In order to simplify the notation, we omit the arguments of the functions where this does not lead to any
confusion.
16The quantity choice of the downstream retailers is constrained by the negotiation outcome with the upstream
suppliers. This constraint is always binding.
6from Di to Dk by e Ukj with j = 1;:::;N1: The switching supplier e Ukj negotiates with Dk about
a delivery tari⁄ in the form of e Tkj(e xkj; e Fkj); taking the contracts between Dk and the initial
suppliers Ukj as given. As the switching upstream ￿rm can adjust its quantity but not its
quality-related production costs, the switching supplier￿ s production costs amount to C(e xkj;qi):
Thus, the pro￿t of the switching supplier e Ukj refers to
e ￿
e Ukj (￿) = e Fkj ￿ C (e xkj;qi): (7)
The pro￿t of the downstream retailer Dk is, then, given by
e ￿Dk (￿) = Rk(Xk + e xkj;￿) ￿
A X
l=a
Fkl ￿ e Fkj with:
(
a = 1; A = N1 for i = 1
a = N1 + 1; A = N for i = 2
(8)
Note that the switching upstream ￿rm e U2j has no further outside option when it fails to achieve
an agreement with D2. In turn, D2 still sells the quantities of those suppliers it has already
made an agreement with, i.e. suppliers U2j: The disagreement payo⁄ of retailer D2 is, thus,
given by





a = 1; A = N1 for i = 1
a = N1 + 1; A = N for i = 2
(9)
Using (7), (8) and (9), the equilibrium bargaining outcome between Dk and the switching ￿rm
e Ukj can be characterized by the solution of
max
e xkj; e Fkj
h
e ￿Dk(￿) ￿ ￿Dk(￿)
i
e ￿
e Ukj (￿): (10)
Taking as given the negotiated quantities with the initial suppliers, the equilibrium quantity e x￿
kj
of the switching supplier is implicitly determined by
@pk(Xk + e x￿
kj;￿)
@e xkj
(Xk + e x￿







kj maximizes the joint pro￿t of retailer Dk and the switching supplier.
The gains from trade are shared by the ￿xed fee. That is, each negotiating party gets its
disagreement payo⁄plus half of the incremental gains from trade. In particular, the retailer and
the switching supplier share equally the marginal contribution of the supplier￿ s delivery to the
overall revenue of the retailer, i.e. Rk(Xk + e x￿
kj;￿) ￿ Rk(Xk;￿); as well as the supplier￿ s total
costs of C(e x￿






Rk(Xk + e x￿




Lemma 1 For given Ni, there exists an equilibrium delivery contract e Tkj(e x￿
kj; e F￿
kj); where e x￿
kj
maximizes the joint pro￿t of the retailer-supplier pair Dk ￿ e Ukj and the ￿xed fee shares the joint
pro￿t.
Proof. Upon Request.
7Negotiations. We turn now to the negotiations between any upstream ￿rm Uij and its
initially selected retailer Di. If the retailer does not reach an agreement with one of its sup-
pliers, it can still sell the quantities delivered by the remaining suppliers. Thus, the retailer￿ s
disagreement payo⁄ is given by





a = 1; A = N1 for i = 1
a = N1 + 1; A = N for i = 2
(13)
Referring to Lemma 1, we specify the disagreement payo⁄ of the upstream ￿rm Uij as
e ￿
e Ukj￿ (￿) = e F￿
kj (￿) ￿ C(e x￿
kj;qi): (14)
Using (13) together with (5),(6) and (14), the equilibrium bargaining outcome between Di and
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ij de￿ned in (??), the equilibrium quantity x￿
ij each supplier Uij delivers to











The ￿xed fees F￿
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i ;￿) + C(x￿
ij;qi)
i
if qi < qk
; (17)
where e ￿






denotes the outside option of supplier Uij if switching to Dk is
possible, i.e. if qi ￿ qk:
Lemma 2 For given Ni, there exists an equilibrium delivery contract Tij(x￿
ij;F￿
ij); i = 1;2;
where x￿
ij maximizes the joint pro￿t of the retailer-supplier pair and the ￿xed fee F￿
ij shares the
joint pro￿t. Furthermore, x￿
ij is decreasing in Ni and increasing in Nk; i = 1;2; k 6= i:
Proof. Upon Request.
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i ;￿) + C(x￿
ij;qi)
i
if qi < qk
; (18)
There exists a discontinuity in the retailers￿reduced-pro￿t functions when suppliers￿outside
options are taken into account. Suppliers delivering to the high-quality retailer have an outside
option in the case of negotiation breakdown, while the suppliers delivering to the low-quality
retailer do not. As a consequence, suppliers delivering to high-quality get a larger share of their
8joint pro￿t with the retailer. Hence, a high-quality retailer pays a larger ￿xed fee to its suppliers
than a low-quality retailer.
Delivery Choice of Upstream Firms. Taking the quality choice of the downstream ￿rms
as given, the upstream ￿rms decide which of the two downstream ￿rms to supply. Obviously,
suppliers improve their bargaining position vis-￿-vis the retailer when opting for the high-quality
retailer. Thus, delivery to the high-quality retailer is at ￿rst more attractive. However, the more
upstream manufacturers supply the same retailer the lower their marginal contribution to the
retailer￿ s pro￿t. Note also that the quantity they deliver to the retailer is decreasing in the
number of other suppliers delivering to the same retailer. Accordingly, we have





2j;N2;q1;q2); 8j = 1;:::;N, is monotonically decreasing in N1:
Proof. Upon Request.





2j;N ￿ 1;￿) and ￿U1j(x￿
1j;F￿
1j;N ￿ 1;￿) < ￿U2j(x￿
2j;F￿
2j;1;￿); the equilibrium number
of ￿rms selling to D1; i.e. N￿








4 Private Quality Standards
We now turn to the analysis of the retailers￿quality decision. Using (19) together with our pre-
vious results, the equilibrium quality requirements of the retailers are given by the maximization
of the retailers￿reduced-pro￿t functions, i.e.
q￿








a = 1; A = N￿
1(q1;q2) for i = 1
a = N￿
1(q1;q2) + 1; A = N for i = 2
:
IThere exists no symmetric equilibrium in qualities if the suppliers have an outside option in the
case of negotiation breakdown. Taking a relatively high quality standard of retailer Dk as given,
the retailer Di has an incentive to undercut the quality requirement of Dk (see Figure 1a).17
By this, Di turns the outside option of its suppliers Uij to zero. At the same time it lowers the
value of the suppliers￿outside option when delivering to the retailer Dk. This is due to the fact
that suppliers switching their deliver to the low-quality retailer still incur the production costs
associated with the higher quality requirements buth without getting rewarded for the higher
quality of their products. This second outside option e⁄ect does not outweigh the ￿rst outside
option e⁄ect such that delivery to the low-quality retailer becomes less attractive. Thus, less
suppliers intend to deliver to the low-quality retailer. Since less severe quality requirements result
in lower production costs, the retailer can compensate the decline of suppliers by purchasing
a larger quantity from each supplier. However, a full compensation is not possible as long as
17Note that the retailer has neither an incentive to slightly undercut nor to overloop the other retailer￿ s quality
requirements as long as the production costs are su¢ ciently convex in quality and quantity.
9the upstream costs are more convex in quantity than in quality (see 4). As consumer prices are
also decreasing due to lower quality production, the joint pro￿t of retailer Di and each of its
suppliers is decreasing. Thus, the retailer gets a larger share of a smaller pie by undercutting
the other retailer￿ s quality requirements.
Taking instead a relatively low value of qk as given, retailer Di has an incentive to increase
its quality requirements (see Figure 1b). As a consequence, the outside option of its suppliers
becomes less valuable. That is, the larger the di⁄erence in quality requirements the less valuable
the outside option of suppliers delivering to the high-quality retailer. At the same time, suppliers
initially delivering to Dk lose their outside option. Hence, delivery to Di becomes more attractive
even though its bargaining strength has improved. If more suppliers deliver to Di; each supplier
Uij delivers less at a lower marginal costs which compensates for the higher production costs in
terms of quality. As the stricter quality standards induce higher consumer prices, the joint pro￿t
of retailer Di with each of its suppliers is increasing. Compared to the low-quality retailer, the
high-quality retailer gets a smaller share of a larger pie.
Accordingly, numerical simulation show that there exist two asymmetric equilibria in the
retailers￿quality choice. Assuming q1 ￿ q2 without loss of generality and denoting the reaction
functions of retailers D1 and D2 by r1(q2) and r2(q1), respectively, Figure 1 illustrates that































Figure 2: Reaction Functions and Equilibrium
Qualities for N = 10
In summary, retailers use their private quality standards to improve their bargaining strength
in the intermediate goods market. By either exceeding or undercutting the other retailer￿ s
quality requirements they weaken the bargaining position of their suppliers. More precisely,
suppliers devliering to the low-quality retailer lose their outside option, while the outside option
of suppliers delivering to the high-quality retailer gets reduced. Accordingly, both retailers get
a larger share of the joint pro￿t with any single supplier.
105 Conclusion
Our results show that social welfare is decreasing in the retailers￿strategic use of their qual-
ity requirements. While the quality requirements set by the high-quality retailer exceed the
corresponding socially optimal quality level, those set by the low-quality retailer undercut the
welfare-optimal low quality. Public regulation in the form of a MQS can remedy this unfavorable
welfare outcome as it increases the lower quality level.
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